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THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE IN THE CLASSROOM
AND THE COURT: AN EPIC STRUGGLE OVER THE
MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has been at odds with
itself for many years over what the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment 1 does and does not protect. particularly
when it comes to speech within public schools. As part of this
debate, a hot topic throughout the decade has been what the
Establishment Clause means for the Pledge of Allegiance and
its recitation in public schools. As the legal community
anxiously awaits the Ninth Circuit's decision in the latest
challenge to the Pledge,2 the United States Supreme Court
must prepare to make a final determination of what impact, if
any, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment has on
voluntary teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance by
public school students.
Unlike its predecessor,:3 the pending litigation, Newdow u.
Congress, 4 appears procedurally sound, which will require the
Court to make a merits-based decision regarding the Pledge.
With two of the most vocal Pledge proponents now removed
from the bench, an in-depth analysis into the Establishment

1. U.S. CONS'!'. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law resp"cting an
cstahlishment of reli;.;ion. or prohibiting the fn•e l'Xercis<' thereof: or abridging tbl'
frppdom of sjwech. or of the pn;ss: or tlw right of the peop]p pcaceabh· to assemhiP. and
to pl'lition tlw Uovernnwnt for a redress of grievances." (emphasis added)).
2. N<·wdow v. Cong .. :38:1 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (i<:.D. Cal. 2005). sub nom. Nl•wdow v.
Rio Linda. No. ();)-172n7 (9th Cir. 2007). When this Comment was last revisc·d in April
200:-l. the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had not yet delivered an opinion in this case.
Until the Supreme Court determines the merits of the constitutional question
surrounding the PleclgP of Alh•giance. however, this Comnwnt remains relevant to tlw
issue at large. <'\'en if not in thP context of Ncu·drJlc u. Cun;.;rcs8.
:l. Elk Cmve Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, fi42 U.S. 1 (2004).
-1. Nc1cdow, :3:-1:1 F. Supp. 2cl at 1229, suiJ nom. Nc>wdow v. f{io Linda. No. OR1 /2i17 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Clause jurisprudence of the Court's two newcomers 1s
particularly needed in order to predict how the Court may
decide this issue. This Comment seeks to conduct such an
analysis to predict how not only the new justices would vote,
but how the entire Court would rule on a challenge to the
Pledge of Allegiance's constitutionality.
While the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and retired Justice
O'Connor are no longer members of the Court, their
concurrences in the 2004 Pledge of Allegiance case Elk Grove
Unified School District v. Newdowfi have not become moot;
rather they represent crucial pieces of the Court's Pledge
jurisprudence. As the Court's most prominent insights into
modern post-Barnette Pledge jurisprudence, the Elk Grove
concurrences are possible trend-setting opinions, especially for
the Court's newest justices, and must be analyzed accordingly.
A. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence

The Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence has
arguably failed to provide clear standards and analytical
frameworks for evaluating constitutional challenges. Several
justices have noticed these problems m the current
jurisprudence.
In Justice Clarence Thomas's Elk Grove Unified School
District v. Newdow!i concurrence, he stated that Lee v.
Weisman7 "adopted an expansive definition of 'coercion' that
cannot be defended however one decides the 'difficult question'
of '[w]hether and how th[e Establishment] Clause should
constrain state action under the Fourteenth Amendment."'8
Justice Thomas further stated that the problems with the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence "run far deeper
than Lee,"9 concluding that "our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray." 10 And Justice Thomas is
not alone in this regard. Justice Antonin Scalia has reached a

<1. Elli (;nH·c. ii4:2 U S. al 1 H-:l:i. :3:3-44.
6. Id. at 1: infm Section lll.D.
7. iiOEi U.S. fi77 (1992): infra Section III.B.
H. Elk Gron•. fi-1:2 U.S. at 4fi (Thomas. ,J., concurring) (quoting Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris. p,;l(; US (i:l9, (i7H (2002) (Thomas, ,J., concurring) (alternation in Ellc
Grove)).

9. Jd.

10. Rosenberger v. ]{ector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., filS U.S. 819, 861 (199fi)
(Thomas .•J., concurring).
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similar finding in his bench opinions:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly
sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly
killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children ....
Its most recent burial, only last Term, was, to be sure, not
fully six feet under: Our decision in Lee u. Weisman
conspicuously avoided using the supposed "test" but also
declined the invitation to repudiate it. Over the years,
however, no fewer than five of the currently sitting ,Justices
have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through
the creature's heart (the author of today's opinion repeatedly),
and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so. 11

Every constitutional test that the Court has set forth to
guide Establishment Clause analyses, such as the infamous
test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 12 has been known to give
unpredictable results. For this reason and others, many have
started to think that maybe Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia,
former Justice O'Connor, and the late Chief Justice Rehnquist
were right-it is time "to begin the process of rethinking the
Establishment Clause." 1:1

B. Objectives
This Comment analyzes the sitting Court's likely Pledge of
Allegiance jurisprudence by looking at past opinions and
current trends to predict how the Court would rule on the
latest Newdow-initiated Pledge litigation, which is pending
before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 14 Section II provides
the proper context for this discussion by recounting how the
Pledge of Allegiance came about, including its drafting,
adoption, legislative history, and subsequent amendments.
Section III examines the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and its application to a recent case
challenging the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance,
while Section IV examines the congressional response. Section
V then examines the current legislation and pending litigation

11. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Frel' Sch. Dist .. :iOH U.S. :JH4. :198
(199:1) (Scalia, .J., concurring) (citation omitt.Pd).
12. 40:3 U.S. 602 (1971); infra Section Ill. B.
18. Elk Groue, fi42 U.S. at 4fi (Thomas .• J.. concurring).
14. Ncwdow. :JH:i F. Supp. 2d at 1229. sub nom. NPwdow v. l{io Linda. No. 0517257 (9th Cir. 2007).
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on these matters. Section VI reviews both the legislative record
and the independent record of the sitting United States
Supreme Court justices to determine how a Pledge of
Allegiance case may be resolved in the current United States
Supreme Court. Finally. Section VII presents the argument of
why the Court should uphold school district policies calling for
voluntary teacher-led recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance.

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
A former Baptist minister named Francis Bellamy wrote
the original Pledge of Allegiance in 1892.15 It was first
published in Youth's Companion, a children-oriented magazine
that had hired Bellamy shortly after his resignation from his
religious post. 16 Bellamy also served as chairman of a
committee of the National Columbian Public School
Celebration in connection with his service to Youth's
Companion. 11 As chairman, he was charged to develop a
program to celebrate the 400th anniversary of Christopher
Columbus's landing in the Americas.1S Bellamy's program
centered around a flag-raising ceremony that included his new
salute to the flag, the "Pledge of Allegiance." 19 During the
summer months before his flag ceremony, Bellamy successfully
petitioned President Benjamin Harrison and Congress to issue
a proclamation in observance of the Columbus Day
celebration.20 While the Pledge of Allegiance was first recited
in public schools as part of a Columbus Day Celebration on
October 12, 1892, thousands of other public and private schools
participated in the Pledge during the official Columbus Day
Celebration on October 21, 1892.21

l!'i. RH'II•\IW .J. ELLIS. To TilE FLAG: TilE UNLIKELY HISTORY OF THI·: I'Llmm: OF
,\LLECI\'iCF: 1. 9 (2005).

Hi. Id. at 19.
17. Id.at14.
1H. ld.

Hl. Jd. at 17-20.

& nAO. Blellamy was also able to gain thee support of Harrisonpredecl·osor l'residl•nt Gmver Cleveland (who was soon thereafter ell•cted again to the·
White House in the year of the Columbus Day celebration). ld. at 15.
21. ld. at 21-2:l. Although Columbus Day was originally planm;d for October 12.
the congressional n•solution changed the date to Octohn 21. Thus. while a few cities
celebrated on OctobPr 12 (notably New York), for the majority of towns celebrating
Columbus Da_1·. schoolchildren rPcited the Pledge for thP first time on Octolwr 21. l 892.
ld.
20. ld. at 16-17
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The Pledge that was adopted in 1892 for the Columbus Day
observance is somewhat different than the version that
survives today. It read, "I pledge allegiance to my Flag and to
the Republic for which it stands-one Nation indivisible-with
Liberty and Justice for all."22 At the 1923 National Flag
Conference, the Pledge of Allegiance took to a national stage
and began its metamorphosis out of Bellamy's hands and into
mainstream American society. 23 The Conference leadership
changed the phrase "my Flag" to "the Flag of the United States
of America," over Bellamy's protests.24 The Pledge amendment
sought to make it clear to immigrants that the flag being
referenced was in fact the United States' Flag and not the flag
of a state or any other nation.25 This amendment was adopted
and the Pledge of Allegiance remained unchanged for thirty
years-that is until the Knights of Columbus began a
campaign to add "under God" to the text of the Pledge.26
A. "Under God"
The Knights of Columbus,
a
Catholic fraternal
organization, did not think the Pledge fully encompassed the
fabric of America without a mention of God.27 So, in 1952, the
Supreme Council of the Knights of Columbus amended the
Pledge for recitation at its meetings by adding the phrase
"under God" after "one nation."2R The Knights of Columbus
then petitioned the President of the United States, the Vice
President of the United States, and the Speaker of the United
States House of Representatives to similarly amend the
Pledge.29
In 1953, Representative Louis Rabaut of Michigan
sponsored the first resolution in the United States Congress to
amend the Pledge accordingly.30 Although they failed at first,
22. !d. at 19. The salute to accompany thP PledgP consisted of raising one's arm
toward the flag, but this salutP was rpplaced by placing one's hand over one's heart
after the Bellamy salute became associated with Fascism and thl' Nazis during tlw
Second World War. !d. at 20, 91. See 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
2:3. ELLIS, supra note 15. at 58, 65.
24. !d. at 65. 68.
25. lei. at 65--116.
2fi. !d. at 129-:lO.
27. ld. at 130-:n
28. lei. at 130.
29. !d.
:10. hi. at 131.

286

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

r2oos

the Knights of Columbus and other fraternal organizations
refused to give up and began to use Lincoln's Gettysburg
address, which included the phrase "under God," as persuasive
authority justifying the change.:n
Reverend George MacPherson Docherty, a Presbyterian
minister and pastor of the New York Avenue Presbyterian
Church in Washington D.C., advocated adding "under God" to
the Pledge, which was inspired by a phrase in Abraham
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, during his Sunday sermon to
commemorate Lincoln's birthday.:l2 The following day, one of
Docherty's petitiOners, Representative Charles Oakman,
introduced a resolution to the House that would codify the
inclusion of "under God" in the Pledge.:1:1 Two days later,
Senator Homer Ferguson presented an identical resolution to
the Senate.34
The Oakman-Ferguson resolution, S.J.R. 126 in the Senate
and H.J.R. 24:3 in the House, passed both chambers of
Congress and President Eisenhower signed the bill into law on
Flag Day, June 14, 1954.:1:1 Shortly thereafter, Eisenhower
declared, "From this day forward, millions of our school
children will daily proclaim ... the dedication of our nation and
our people to the Almighty.":Hi Some opponents may argue that
this statement by the President reveals the true intent of the
amendment: to inculcate schoolchildren with religious tenets.
Proponents may argue, however, that a statement by a sitting
president cannot constitute legislative intent.

B. The Codified Pled{{e
In 1954, the decision of Congress and the President to add
the phrase "under God" to the text of the Pledge of Allegiance
brought the Pledge of Allegiance to the form we know today.:37
The Pledge of Allegiance and its ceremonial recitation is now
codified in 4 U.S.C. § 4:

:n. Sec id.

at 12•1. I :12.
:l2. !d. at 132- :J:l. Coincidently. l'rcsich·nt EisenhowPr, who was in attendance at
the· s<•rmon. was si1ting in the Lincoln pew at the time. Id. at J:l2. Evident!~·. h<• latc•r
told Iloclwrt~· that he "agn·<·d with [th<; sl'rmonJ 'entirely.'" !d. at l:O:l.
:n. !d. at l:n
:1-1. !d. at l:l:\.
:l:>. !d. at l:lfi-:l7.

:Hi. Jd. at 1::37.

:n.

I U.S.C. ~ 1 (2000).
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The Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag: "I pledge allegiance to
the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic
for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with
liberty and justice for all.," should be rendered by standing at
attention facing the flag with the right hand over the heart.
When not in uniform men should remove any non-religious
headdress with their right hand and hold it at the left
shoulder, the hand being over the heart. Persons in uniform
should remain silent, face the flag, and render the military
salute.:ls

Even before the Pledge's codification in the United States
Code, school districts nationwide began to institute policies
mandating the daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.39
Unlike today, most of the Pledge policies of the day called for
compulsory recitation of the Pledge and students declining to
participate in the exercise for any reason were disciplined
accordingly.40 It did not take long for such compulsory policies
to make the Supreme Court's docket, however.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN COURT
The twentieth century was a time of much development in
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. An issue of fierce
debate that still continues today, 216 years after the
ratification of the First Amendment, is what the Framers
intended by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses and
how those clauses should be applied more than two centuries
later.

A. Early Challenges
The first challenge to these compulsory Pledge policies
reached the Supreme Court in 1940, fourteen years before the
insertion of the phrase "under God," in the case of Minersville
School District v. Gobitis. 41 In Minersville, the Court ruled that
public school districts could compel students to participate in
reciting the Pledge of Allegiance,42 including students who saw
the Pledge as a blasphemous idolatry in conflict with their
:18. !d.
39. EI.LI:-;. ;;upm notl' 1 G. at I :lti.
40. ld. at 91-9~.
41.

:no U.S.

42.

ld. at

Gs(i ( 1940).

G~JH-GOO.
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religious convictions, as the Gobitises did in Minersville. 4:3 The
Minersville rule did not stand for long, however. The Court
overruled its Minersville decision in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette. 44 The Court held that "compulsory
unification of opinion" violated the First Amendment. 45

B. The Path That Led to Elk Grove and Its Renewed Challenge
Since the overt compulsion in Barnette is not equally
present in today's Pledge policies, the Court has borrowed a lot
of its modern Pledge of Allegiance jurisprudence from
Establishment Clause principles found in more blatantly
religion-based cases. In School District of Abington Township,
Pennsylvania v. Schempp, the Supreme Court issued a ruling
on two companion cases that both dealt with school policies
requiring daily readings from the Bible.46 The Court held that
this practice, as well as the practice of requiring a daily
recitation of the Lord's Prayer, was unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause.47 In their Schempp concurrence,
however, Justices Goldberg and Harlan stated:
Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the
significance of the fact that a vast portion of our people
believe in and worship God and that many of our legal,
political and personal values derive historically from religious
teachings. Government must inevitably take cognizance of the
existence of religion and, indeed, under certain circumstances
the First Amendment may require that it do so. 4R

In Lemon, the Court held that Rhode Island's Salary
Supplement Act, which provided supplemental salary for
teachers in nonpublic schools, and Pennsylvania's Nonpublic
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which reimbursed
nonpublic schools for teachers' salaries, were unconstitutional
because their impact predominantly benefited parochial
schools. The Court deemed these practices "excessive
entanglement between government and religion." 49 In its

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 591-92.
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

Id. at

641.

374 U.S. 20:3, 205, 211, 226--27 (1963).
Id. at 205-06, 226-27.
Id. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07, 614 (1961).
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Lemon opinion, the Court developed a test for determining
whether statutes violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.50 The Court held that in order for a statute
to pass constitutional muster, it must (1) have a secular
purpose; (2) not have the primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion; and (3) not foster an excessive
entanglement of government and religion. 51
In the time between the Lemon and the Lee decisions, the
Court has used three tests to measure constitutionality of
school-based statutory programs and policies that are criticized
for being too cozy with religion. First, the Court applied the
Lemon test, which, as stated above, requires that the statute
have a secular purpose, not have the primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion, and not foster excessive
entanglement between government and religion.52
In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Court expounded upon the Lemon
test while simultaneously declaring that it refused "to be
confined to any single test or criterion."5:3 The Court held that
"[i]n each case, the inquiry calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per
se rule can be framed."54 It is in this "line-drawing process"
that the Court acknowledged the utility of the Lemon test.55
Nevertheless, the Court permitted a municipality's display of a
nativity scene by focusing almost exclusively on the purpose
prong, recognizing that even when religion substantially
benefited, a secular purpose has saved such expressions from
conflicting with the Establishment Clause.56 The Court
demonstrated the truth of this principle by holding that
"notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche," the
city demonstrated a secular purpose that does not violate the
Establishment Clause.G7
In spite of the Court's dispositive use of the purpose prong
to excuse the nativity display, Justice O'Connor would have
modified the Lemon test in Lynch. She argued in her Lynch
c,o. !d.

at G12 1:L
!d.
Ci2. !d.
,):l. Hi''i U.S. fi(i8. 679 (1984) (holding that a nativit~; scene display by a
municipal it:> die\ not violate tht> Establishnwnt Clause).
i'i4. !d. at 678.
fifi. !d. at (i7(J.
fi6. !d. at (i80. The Court held that "[<>]ntanglenwnt is a question of kind and
clegret> ... !d. at 684.
i'i7. lrl. at 687.
:11.
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concurrence that the government's "actual purpose" must be to
endorse or denounce religion, while the effect prong mandates
that the act "in fact convey[] a message of endorsement or
disapproval," without consideration of the government's actual
purpose.58
In the Court's explanation of Lemon, it held that the focus
of its inquiry must be in the proper context. ;)9 In Lynch, that
meant that the Court had to analyze the nativity scene's
constitutionality "in the context of the Christmas season."oO It
follows, then, that under a Lynch rationale, the Court would
have to analyze the Pledge within the context of educational
instruction and curriculum.
In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,
the Court revised the Lemon test and developed a second test:
the endorsement test.61 This test asked whether the
government effectively endorses religion by passing and
enforcing a statute. Government action fails the endorsement
test by having either the purpose or the effect of favoring a
particular religious belief or established religion. 62
The third test used by the Court in its Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is the coercion test from Lee v.
Weisman. 63 In Lee, a public school principal invited a rabbi to
offer a prayer at the middle school's graduation ceremony.ol
Weisman, a student, sought to prevent the prayer by way of a
court order. 65 The motion was denied shortly before the
ceremony that she attended.oo Weisman and her father
subsequently brought an action and sued for a permanent
injunction against Providence public schools from having clergy
deliver prayers at future graduations, including her high school
graduation.67 The district court granted relief to Weisman,

i1H. Jd. at 690 (O'Connor. J .. concurring).
i19. !d. at 679 (majority opinion).
(iO. !d.
Gl. 492 U.S. i17:l, fi92-94 (1989). Using this test. thP Court hPld that tlw displav
of a cn~che violated the Establishment Clause, but that the display of a rrwnorah twxt
to a Christmas tree did not have the unconstitutional effect of endorsing Christian and
.Jewish faiths in an action against a municipality. !d. at G21.
G2.

6:1.

!d.

:10:) U.S. 577 (1992).
64. !d. at 581.
(ifi. !d. at 584.
()(). !d.
G7. !d.
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through an application of the Lemon test, holding that the
practice violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. fiH The First Circuit Court of Appeals, inflamed by
a school district's open defiance of the court order by offering
another prayer at a graduation, affirmed the district court's
ruling in an opinion consisting of just ninety-five words from
the circuit judge with absolutely no reasoning mentioned other
than a statement that it agreed with the district court: ''We are
in agreement with the sound and pellucid opinion of the
district court and see no reason to elaborate further."69
In a more pungent opinion, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Court, likewise affirmed the permanent injunction against
Providence. Rhode Island public schools. 70 The Court
announced firmly that it would not reconsider its Lemon
decision71 and held that clergy offering prayers as part of a
public school graduation ceremony is barred by the
Establishment Clause. 7'2 The Court did not apply the Lemon
test to the facts of the case. Instead, the Court held that the
prayer ceremony at the graduation failed to pass the new
coercion test and thus did not pass constitutional muster.7:l
On the issue of coercion, the Court held that "a high school
graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer
pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least,
maintain respectful silence during the invocation and
benediction."/! The Court argued that since adolescents are
susceptible to peer pressure, the "use [of] social pressure to
enforce orthodoxy" violates the Establishment Clause.75 The
Court in essence equated peer pressure with government
compulsion to act. Holding that high school graduation is "one
of life's most significant occasions," the Court suggested that
students are not free to abstain from participating in the
ceremony. 76 The coercion test, then, as deduced from the
opinion in Lee, finds that government action violates the

fl~.

Weisman v. Lee, 72S F. Supp. 68, 7'2, 75 (D.R.L 1990).

fi9. Weisman v. Lee, 90H F.2d 1090, 1090 (1st Cir. 1990).
70. l"ce. 50i1 U.S. at 586.
II. !d. at ;)Hi.
12. ld. at i19~J.
7:L Sec id. at !)99.
71. Jd. at ;)9:\.
/;). !d. at i19l.
7fi. !d. at i19fi.
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Establishment Clause if: (1) the action is directed by the
government; (2) the act is a formal religious exercise; and (3)
the direction by the government compels participation in the
exercise from those present or in attendance. 77
Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in Lee, which was
joined by Justice Thomas, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
the late Justice White. 78 Justice Scalia explained that he could
not join the opinion because it went against an opinion he
joined in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union 79 coincidentally also written by ,Justice Kennedy.so In
that opinion, Justice Kennedy urged that the Establishment
Clause must be construed in light of the Nation's political and
cultural heritage.Hl For this purpose, the Court declared that
"[a] test for implementing the protections of the Establishment
Clause that, if applied with consistency, would invalidate
longstanding traditions cannot be a proper reading of the
Clause."82
Justice Scalia's Lee dissent further stated that since
prayers at graduations have "long been recognized" and are
"widely established,"83 Court precedent does not allow an
interpretation of the Establishment Clause that prohibits the
practice. 84 This can equally be said of the Pledge of Allegiance.
which has been recited in public classrooms since its inception
in 1892. The dissent continued on to call the Lee majority's
opmwn "incoherent," and classified its discussion of
physiological coercion of adolescents as "[going] beyond the
realm where judges know what they are doing."8i) ,Justice
Scalia called the Court's notion that a student who respectfully
sits during a prayer without participating "has somehow ...
joined-in" as "nothing short of ludicrous."HG The dissent also

77. See id. at 58G 117.
78. Id. at G31 (Scalia ..J.. dissenting).

79. Id.; see 492 U.S. i'i73. G5i'i (19119) (Kennedy . . J.. concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
80. As with .Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Lee, .Justice Kennedy's opinion
in Allegheny was likewise joined by Chief .Justice Rehnquist and .Justic" Whill'. See
Alle{fheny, 492 U.S. at 65i'i.
81. Id. at 670.
82. Id.
8:1. Lee, 505 U.S. at 6:16 (Scalia,,) .. disol'nting).
84. Id. at 631.
85. Id. at 6:36.
86. Id. at 637.
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noted the majority's failure to apply the Lemon test and
suggested that its ignoring Lemon altogether is a manifestation
of its irrelevance.87
In a particularly relevant comparison, the Lee dissent
questioned how the Court could determine that psychological
coercion existed during the prayer, but failed to disapprove of
the students standing for the recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance immediately preceding the rabbi's prayer.ss In a
foreshadowing of where some federal courts' Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is today, Justice Scalia announced that
the Pledge of Allegiance, as amended, would raise the same
Establishment Clause issues as the prayers did in Lee.89 As
Justice Scalia predicted, these Establishment Clause cases
stemming out of school prayer, such as Lee, have become the
crux of the Pledge of Allegiance analysis for some federal
courts-especially in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 90 The
dissent rhetorically asked if the Pledge must now be struck
down in a sarcastic tone that indicated their view of such an
assertion as nothing more than a ridiculous argument that
could not be furthered on legal principles.9l The dissent
recognized a slippery slope for references to ceremonial deism
lest the Court's axe next fall on something as benign as the
Pledge of Allegiance, which would "be the next project for the
Court's bulldozer."92
The dissent labeled the majority's definition of coercion as
the "deeper flaw" of the Lee opinion.93 In its view, the adoption
of "peer pressure" as sufficient coercion fails to meet "[t]he
coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of
religion."94 Traditionally, coercion was identified with a more
repressive definition: "[B]y force of law and threat of penalty."95
According to the dissent, coercion needed to be stronger than
the unpleasantries of peer-pressure.96 Comparing the Lee facts

ld. at 644.
ld. at 638.
ld. at 6:19.
8ee, e.g., Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 606-07, 609 (9th Cir. 2002).
Lee. 505 U.S. at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. ld.
9:1. ld. at 640.
94. !d.
9R. !d. Black's Law Dictionary defines coercion as: "Compulsion by physical force
or threat of physical force.'' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
96. 8ee Lee, f)():) U.S. at 640-41.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
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with those of Barnette, the dissent noted that the students in
Barnette were faced with expulsion, institutional confinement.
and prosecution of the students' parents.97 The dissent stated
that it was thus an "extravagant claim" to assert that the state
coerced the students in Lee. 9H
In a closing statement equally applicable to the Pledge of
Allegiance, Justice Scalia noted the voluntary nature of the
exercises in Lee, much like the recitation of the Pledge: "To
deprive our society of that important unifying mechanism, in
order to spare the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal
inconvenience of standing or even sitting in respectful
nonparticipation, is as senseless in policy as it is unsupported
in law."99
Before Elh Grove v. Newdow, the Court last had an
opportunity to consider the Pledge's constitutionality in 1993,
but it denied certiorari.lOO In 1992, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a school district's
policy of conducting a voluntary recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance, including the
words "under God,"
was
constitutional.lOl Thus, by the time Elh Grove reached the
Supreme Court, it had been more than a decade since a federal
appellate court had addressed the constitutionality of the
Pledge of Allegiance.

C. The Michael Newdow Crusade
The Elk Grove Unified School District had a policy that
required each of its elementary school classes to have a daily
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.102 Participation in the
Pledge exercise was voluntary, based on the district's Pledge
policy, and schools did not punish students for declining to
pledge their allegiance to the f1ag.103
Michael Newdow, an atheist minister. had a daughter who

97. !d. at 642.

9H.

Id.
Id. at 646.
100. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21. 9HO F.2d l:l/ (7th Cir. 1~HJ:!). ccrt.
99.

denied. i10tl U.S. 9Ei0 (199:1).
101. Id. at 44R. This case proved to be sufficiently persuasiw to thl" district murt
judge who upheld the Pledge in Newdow's 2000 challeng<e. Newdow v. Cong., 201)() WL
:J550fi91G, at *1 (E.D. Cal. :WOO).
102. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow. 542 U.S. I, 7-R (2004).
10:1.

See id.
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attended a school within the Elk Grove District boundaries.l04
His daughter participated in the Pledge recitation at school-a
practice that Newdow called a religious indoctrination of his
child.l05 Newdow, representing himself in court, brought suit
alleging that he had standing to do so on his own behalf and on
behalf of his daughter as next friend.l06 Newdow claimed that
the Pledge of Allegiance was inherently unconstitutional
because of the words "under God" in the Pledge's text.l07 He
also argued that the district's policy violated the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment to the
Constitution.lOH The magistrate judge who heard the case
determined that the Pledge does not violate the Religion
Clauses and is therefore constitutional.lO~J The District Court
agreed with the magistrate judge and dismissed Newdow's
complaint.llO Newdow appealed to the United States Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
lower court, issuing three separate opinions in the single
appeal. Ill
1. l'J ewdow I

The first of the three Newdow decisions handed down by
the Ninth Circuit came on June 26, 2002.112 The court held
that Newdow had standingll:3 and reversed the decision of the
trial court on the case's merits.ll4 In its opinion, the court
applied the Lemon test to the Pledge of Allegiance and the Elk
10•. Complaint at 14. Hl. New dow v. (\mg .. :2000 WL :l550ii91 () (E. D. Cal. :2000)
(No. ClV. S-00-0495MLSPANPS).
10fi. !d. at 20, 22.
106. !d. at :1, 2G. Black's Law Dictionary defirw,.; a "next friend" as "[a[ person who
appears in a lawsuit to act for the benefit of an incompetent or minor plaintiff, but who
is not a party to the lawsuit and is not appointPd as a guardian." BL\CI(S L-'.\\'
DICTIO:--JAHY (Hth ed. 2004).
107. Ser id. at :H.
lOH. !d. at 24-25.
109. Newdow v. Cong .. No. ClVS-00-0,19fiMLSI'ANPS. 2000 WL :3fifi059W. at *1
(E.D. Cal. Julv 21. 2000).
110. ld.
111. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d fi97 (9th Cir. 2002): Nt'wdow v. U.S. Cong.,
:l13 F.:ld 500 (~Jth Cir. 2002): Newclow v. U.S. Cong .. :l28 F.:ld 46fi (9th Cir. :200:1).
112. Neu•duw. 292 F.3d !>97. Newdow also joined Pn·siclent Clinton; the state of
Califomia; Elk Grove Unified School District; David W. Gordon. Superintendent
ECUSD: Sacramento City Unified Sl'hool Distril't: and .Jim Swt>c•ne\', Super·intPndent
SCUSD to the action. ld.
11 :;, !d. at fiOi>.
11-1. ld. at fi12.
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Grove policy, concluding that both inherently violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and are thus
unconstitutional.ll5
Judge Fernandez dissented, stating that "Congress has not
compelled anyone to do anything"116 and arguing that the
Religion Clauses "were not designed to drive religious
expression out of public thought." 117 He also observed that the
religious substance of the "under God" addition to the Pledge
was so small that it is de minimis, or so minimal that the law
does not take it into consideration. us

2. Newdow II
In response to Newdow I, Sandra Banning, the mother of
Newdow's daughter, filed a motion to intervene.ll9 Although
Banning and Newdow shared physical custody of their
daughter, Banning had sole legal custody of the child, which
included the exclusive right to represent the child's legal and
educational interests.l20 She argued that her daughter did not
have any objections to saying or hearing the Pledge of
Allegiance, and that it was in the child's best interest not to be
a party to the suit.l2l
On December 4, 2002, the Ninth Circuit handed down its
second opinion in the Newdow suit.122 After the court's initial
June decision, the case received considerable national
attention. For example, the United States Senate tried to
intervene as a party after the June decision, but was deemed to
lack standing to do so by the Ninth Circuit.123
More importantly, however, the court denied Sandra
Banning's motion to intervene or, in the alternative, to
dismiss.124 The court held that the mother's sole legal custody
did not deprive Newdow of Article III standing to bring the suit

115. ld. at

611. (;!2.

1Hi.

Id. at 612 (Fernandez. J .. concurring and dissenting).
117. Id. at 61::1.
llH. Id.
119. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 9 (2004).
120. Id.

121. Jd.at9-10.
122. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 31:l F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2002).
12>l. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 31 :l F.3d 495. 499 (9th Cir. 2002).
124. Ne1t·dmc, :11:i F.3d i'iOO, 50i'i.
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on behalf of his daughter in federal court. 125 On the merits of
the case, the court held that when a school teacher leads
students in reciting the Pledge, a message is sent that the state
endorses "not just religion generally, but a monotheistic
religion organized 'under God."' 126
3. N ewdow III

The Ninth Circuit handed down its third and final opinion
on February 28, 2003.127 The court amended its earlier
opinion, omitting the discussion of Newdow's standing to
challenge 4 U.S.C. § 4, and then considered the defendants'
motion for an en bane review. 12H While the court denied a
motion for an en bane review, nine judges dissented at least in
part to the denial for en bane review.129
4. Man on a "mission"

Besides his challenges to the phrase "under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance, Newdow has filed suits to strike the
national motto, 130 enjoin the practice of praying at presidential
inaugurations, 1:n
and to eliminate the congressional

125. ld. at 50G. In response to Banning's motion, Newdow filPd a motion for Rult•
11 sanctions against her lawyer, which the court also denil•d. Id.
126. Id.
127. NPwdow v. U.S. Cong., :328 F.Jd 466 (9th Cir. 200:l).
128. Id. at 46tHi9.
129. Id. at 471-9:1.
130. A challenge to "In God We Trust" was filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California on November 18, 200G. The court dismissed the action on
,June 12. 2006. Newdow v. Congress, 4:35 F.Supp.2d 1066 (E.D.Cal. 200fi). sub tWill.
Newdow v. LeFevre, No. 06-16344 (9th Cir. argued Dec. 4. 2007). The Ninth Circuit
heard oral arguments in this appeal on the same day that it heard oral arguments in
the Pledge of Allegiance case.
1:n. On February 1. 2001, Newdow filed a lawsuit to enjoin the practice of praying
at presidential inaugurations after two Christian clergymen offered prayers at GeorgP
W. Bush's inauguration on January 20, 2001. The trial court ruled that this did not
violate the Constitution and Newdow appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appt'ab
held that Nt'wdow did not have standing to bring the suit. See also Mike N<ewdow"s
Past Litigation Page, http://www.restorethepledge.com/live/past_litigation (last visited
Mar. 30. 2008) [hereinafter Liti!{ation]; see Newdow v. Bush. 2004 WL 3344:JH (9th Cir.
2004). Then, on December 17, 2004, Newdow filed another lawsuit to enjoin President
Bush's Presidential Inaugural Committee from having chaplains provide prayers at
Bush's second inauguration. l~itigation, supra; see Newdow v. Bush. :lG5 F.Supp.2d 2fiG
(D.D.C. 200R). A motion for a preliminary injunction was denied on Januar~' 14, 200il.
and the Court of Appeals affirmed that denial on ,January Hi. Litigation. supm;
Newdow. :JGFi F. Supp. 2d 2fiG; Newdow v. Bush, 200G WL 89011 (D.C. Cir. 200G).
According to Michael Newdow's Weh site, the United States Supreme Court denit>d
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chaplain.1:32 He is currently shopping for the '"proper' plaintiff'
to bring suit on these issues again.133

D. Elk Grove v. Newdow
The United States Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari
to Elk Grove Unified School District on October 14, 20031:'34
and heard oral arguments on March 24, 2004.1:35 The Court
issued its decision on June 14, 2004, in an opinion written by
Justice Stevens.136 The Court held that because California law
deprives Newdow of the right to sue as next friend, he did not
have Article III standing to challenge the school district's
Pledge of Allegiance policy in federal court.t:l7 To have
standing in federal court, Newdow must have demonstrated
that (1) the Pledge of Allegiance policy caused him actual
injury and (2) that his interests he sought to be protected were
meant to be regulated by the constitutional guarantee in
question.
N ewdow failed the first prong of the standing requirement
because he did not suffer an actual injury and was ineligible to
represent his daughter as next friend. 1:Js Since N ewdow did not
have custody of his daughter, he could not bring a lawsuit on
her behalf without her mother's permission.J:l9 Since Newdow
lacked standing to bring the suit in federal court, the question
of whether the Pledge of Allegiance violates the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment was a moot point.
The late Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, and
former Justice O'Connor issued separate opinions in which
they addressed the constitutional question raised by the case.
certiorari on Jnnuar:-.· 19. mw da\· prior to Bush's 200il inauguration. Following the
inauguration, final judgment was rendered on Newdow's suit by a federal district
court. He was ch,nied relief on the basis that he lacked standing to bring the suit and
that the point at issue was moot. See Litigation, supra.
1:32. Newdow filed a lawsuit to discontinue the use of congressional chaplains in
August. 2002. but the District Court for the District of Columbia held that Newdow
lacked standing to bring tlw suit. See Utigotion, supra note l:ll; sec also Newdow v.
Eagc•n, :w9 F.Supp.2d 29 (D. D.C. 2004).
1 :J:l. Sec Litigation. supra note 1:-ll (sc•eking a '"proper' plaintiff' to challenge the
use of congressional chaplains).
l:l-±. Elk Grovc• Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 540 U.S. 945 (200:3).
J:lG. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ncwdow. 542 U.S. I (2004).
l:Hi. Jd.

1:n. ld. at 17 lS.
J:lS. Id.
1:39. Jd.
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In what were labeled as concurring opinions, the three justices
dissented to the Court's conclusion that Newdow lacked
prudential standing to bring the suit on behalf of his daughter,
but concurred in the judgment of the Court based on the merits
of the case through an analysis of the constitutional
question.140
1. Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence
With his semi-accusatory opening, Chief Justice Rehnquist
called the Court's reasoning for dismissal "a novel prudential
standing principle in order to avoid reaching the merits of the
constitutional c1aim."l41 The Chief Justice stated that he
dissented from the opinion that Newdow lacked standing to
sue, but concurred in the judgment based on the merits of the
constitutional claim. 142 He stated that the school district's
Pledge policy, which "require[d] teachers to lead willing
students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes
the words 'under God,' does not violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment." 14:1
The Chief Justice took a more historical approach than the
other concurring justices, stressing that the Pledge and its
"under God" language represents a well-established patriotic
exercise with roots in the nation's founding, not a religious
exercise analogous to the prayer in Lee. 14+ He cited historical
authority consisting of examples of "patriotic invocations of
God and official acknowledgements of religion's role in our
Nation's history." 145 Some of the examples given by Chief
Justice Rehnquist included George Washington's first
inauguration, Washington's "day of public thanksgiving and
prayer" proclamation, Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address
and second inaugural address, Woodrow Wilson's request to
Congress for a declaration of war against Germany in World
War I, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's first inaugural address, and
Dwight D. Eisenhower's admonition to soldiers during World

140. !d. at 1H (I{Phnquist. C ..J .. concurring): id. at
at 45 (Thomas, J .. concurring).
141. Jd. at 18 (Rehnquist, C. ,J., concurring).
142. Jd.
143. Jd.
144. !d. at 26. :11.
145. Jd. at 26.

:o:l

(O'Connor ..J.. concmring): id.
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War II.l46
Chief Justice Rehnquist also recognized the long tradition
of this acknowledgement by pointing to many common civic
declarations that have a similar reference to God. These
included the national motto, "In God We Trust;"l47 a phrase in
the national anthem, "In God is our trust;"148 and the opening
proclamation by the Marshal of the Supreme Court, "God save
the United States and this honorable Court."149
"The phrase 'under God' [in the Pledge] is in no sense a
prayer, nor an endorsement of any religion," the Chief Justice
recognized. 150 As such, he argued that the facts in the Elk
Grove case are sufficiently different from Lee as to make Lee
inapplicable because the Pledge is neither an explicit religious
exercise nor a formal religious exercise.151 The Pledge, he
stated, is a patriotic observance and an oath to the Nation and
"not to any particular God, faith, or church."152 Additionally,
he noted that students may abstain from pledging their
allegiance and are thus not coerced to do so by the
government.lG3 To allow Michael Newdow or any other person
to use a "heckler's veto" against such a voluntary patriotic
exercise is, the Chief Justice reasoned, "an unwarranted
extension of the Establishment Clause." 154

2. Justice O'Connor's concurrence
Justice O'Connor likewise concluded that the school
district's Pledge of Allegiance policy "does not offend the
Establishment Clause." 155 Her opinion focused less on the
historical argument and more on a principle-based argument in
favor of the Pledge's constitutionality.156
Her main premise was that the Establishment Clause

14fi. Id. at 26--29.
14 7. :l6 U.S. C. ~ :301 (2000).
141-l. FIL\:\CIS SCOTT KEY, The Star-Spanf{led Banner (1814). Line six of the f"ourth
verse of the Star-Spangled Banner includes the phrase, "In God is our Trust." ld. See
also :ofi U.S.C. § :w2 (2000).
149. mk Graue, fi42 U.S. at 29-30.
150. ld. at :31.
1iil. ld.
lfi2. Jd.
lfi:l. !d. at :11 n.1.
1 fi4. ld. at :o:l.
1;;;;_ !d. at :3;3 (O'Connor .•J., concurring).
] 56. !d.
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cannot be reduced to a single test, but that the '"different
categories of Establishment Clause cases [... ] may call for
different approaches."'l57 Justice O'Connor suggested that a
revised endorsement test is the most appropriate test to apply
in cases such as Elk Grove that deal with a concept of
ceremonial deism contained within the text of the Pledge of
Allegiance and other civic observances.l58
Justice O'Connor explained that there are two principles
that must be examined by a court when applying the
endorsement test. First, the objective viewpoint of a
"reasonable observer" must be considered since a subjective
approach to the endorsement analysis would "reduce the test to
an absurdity," yielding unpredictable and arbitrary results.159
Second, the exercise must be viewed in its proper context and
origins so that the reasonable observer would know the history
and place of the conduct before applying the test so that the
analysis could truly be objective.160
Applying this approach to the endorsement test, Justice
O'Connor concluded that "[t]he reasonable observer ... fully
aware of our national history and the origins of such practices,
would not perceive [the Pledge] as signifying a government
endorsement of [religion]." 161 She labeled such references to
God as mere references to ceremonial deism.162
According to Justice O'Connor, references to ceremonial
deism do not offend the Constitution when examined in light of
their context, character, and history.163 She concluded that the
reference to God in the Pledge is an example of ceremonial
deism, as are the references in the national motto and the
national anthem.164 To determine whether "God" is a reference
to a religious belief or merely to ceremonial deism, Justice
O'Connor proposed a four-part test: (1) the reference is
historical; (2) it is not overly prayerful; (3) it is nonsectarian;

157. ld. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O'Connor, .J.,
concurring)).
15/l. ld. at 33-34.
159. ld. at 34-35.
160. !d.
1Gl. !d. at 3G.
1G2. !d. at 37. Before O'Connor's Elh Graue concurrence, ,Justice Brennan
recognized the ceremonial deism argument in his Lynch u. Donnelly dissent. 4f)fi U.S.
668, 71G (Brennan, .J., dissenting).
1G:L Rlh Graue, 542 U.S. at 37 (O'Connor, J .. concurring).
164. ld.
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and (4) it contains only minimal religious content.l65 Through
adherence to this formula, Justice O'Connor suggests that a
practice that passes muster could not be perceived to endorse
religion by the reasonable observer.166
Applying this test to the case, she concluded that the Pledge
of Allegiance merely contains a reference to ceremonial
deism. 167 As such, the phrase "under God" in the Pledge is
constitutional; it is allowed under the Establishment Clause
because it is not incorporated into any religion's canon, it is not
administered by members of the clergy in public schools, it does
not meet the Court's definition of prayer, it is a historical
reference to the United States as a Nation, and because the
reference is an inconsequential two words.16H She further
noted that the brevity of the phrase supports the notion that it
is not meant to endorse religion and that it allows for easy
opting out by students who do not wish to utter the phrase
"under God." 1(1~
Justice O'Connor also pointed out that although the Pledge
has been recited in schools for fifty years since the addition of
the "under God" phrase, Elk Grove was only the third challenge
to its constitutionality in federal court. 170 She discounted the
explanation that a timid citizen-base was unwilling to
challenge the Pledge on Establishment Clause grounds.l71 She
pointed out that, in the interim, Establishment Clausegrounded challenges have been made on a broad range of
practices: reading stories about witches and Halloween in
school, using The Learning Tree in literature classes, providing
an explanation of the theory of evolution in a museum, and
using an Aztec sculpture in a Mexican culture commemoration,
among others. 172
In summary, Justice O'Connor argued that the Pledge's
reference to God is a reference to ceremonial deism, which is an
"inevitable consequence of the religious history that gave birth

Hiii. /d. at :n-,14.
1fi(i. See id. at :Hi-:38.
Hi7. Jd. at :37.
lfiH. ld. at 40--4:).
1fi~. !d. at 4:\.
170. ld. at :)H-:l~l.
1 1"1. ld. at :39.
172. !d. at :w.
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to our founding principles of liberty." 173 Nothing less should be
expected in the founding of the Nation by "religious refugees"
and references to ceremonial deism in patriotic exercises must
be examined in that context.l74
3. Justice Thomas's concurrence

Justice Thomas unequivocally stated his purpose for
writing his concurrence: "We granted certiorari in this case to
decide whether the ... Pledge policy violates the Constitution.
The answer to that question is: 'no."'17fi Justice Thomas
immediately attacked the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, which he described as being in "hopeless
disarray." 17fi He specifically attacked the Lee decision, stating
that "Lee adopted an expansive definition of 'coercion' that
cannot be defended." 177 He noted, however, that the problem
goes beyond Lee>. 17H
Justice Thomas admitted that "[i]t is difficult to see how
[the Pledge] does not entail an affirmation that God exists."l79
Thus, if the Court followed Lee and other Court precedents on
point, it would he required to strike down the Pledge of
Allegiance as unconstitutional.lSO With the correction of Lee
and other Establishment Clause jurisprudence, however,
Justice Thomas would uphold the Pledge policy because he
believes that it is not subject to the Establishment Clause in
the first place.lHl The main premise of Justice Thomas's
concurrence is that the Establishment Clause is a federalism
provision that cannot be incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and is thus moot in the determination of whether
the Pledge policy of the Elk Grove School District violates the
Establishment Clause.1S2 In fact, Justice Thomas asserted that

17:1.

!d. at 44.
17 4. fcl. at :l:'i :l7.
17:). Id. at 'lfi (Thomas, ,J., concurring).
176. !d. (quoting ]{osPnhL•rger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va .. !)15 U.S. 819,
Stil (J>J}.li'i) (Thomas .. 1.. concurring)).
1/1. Jcl. at 4i'i.
1/8. lcl.
119. ld. at ·IS.
JSO. lei. at 4ti. l~l.
181. Tel. at 4ti.
1S:2. I d. at 4i'i· 'lfi. In constitutional law, incorporation opnotl's a special meaning.
Incorporation is tlw mPans of applying provisions from the Bill of Rights to the states
hy way of interprding thl' Four·1.PPnth Amendment's Due Process Clause to encompass
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by incorporating the Establishment Clause and applying it to
the states, the government would be violating the very thing
that the Establishment Clause was meant to protect: freedom
from congressional interference with state establishments of
religion.18:3
Looking at the text of the Establishment Clause, Justice
Thomas stated that the Establishment Clause prevents
Congress from establishing a national religion and from
interfering with the state establishment of religion.184 He
asserted that nothing in the language of the Constitution
suggests that the Clause extends any further than that or that
it protects any individual rights from being abridged through
state action due to incorporation.185
Justice Thomas argued that, unlike the Free Exercise
Clause, which protects an individual right, the Establishment
Clause does not protect an individual right, but is merely a
federalism provision to protect the states from the imposition of
the federal government and thus necessarily resists
incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment.18fi Thus, he
concluded that the Pledge of Allegiance is constitutional
because it does not violate any free exerc1se rights of
individuals.187

those rights. Since its ratification, the Fourteenth Amendment has bcocon used by the
Court to incorporate provisions from the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Amendments.
Total incorporation of the Bill of Rights is rarely advocated since the incorporation of
certain provisions, such as those contained in the Tenth Amendment, would seem
counterproductive to incorporate. More commonly, the Court has taken a ''selective
incorporation" approach by which only Clertain provisions of the Bill of Rights are
applied to thco states through the Fourteenth Anwndmpnfs Due l'rocpss Clause. See,
e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, :378 U.S. 478 (1964) (incorporating Sixth Amendment
guarantee of right to counsel): Mapp v. Ohio. :167 U.S. 64:1 (1961) (incorporating Fourth
Amendment protection against. unreasonable searches and seizures).
18:1. Id.
184. Id. at 50.
185. I d. Tn contrast, the most notable argument in favor of the incorporation of the
Establishment Clause comes from .Justice Brennan's concurTenc<· in Schempp . •]u;;ticP
Brennan argued that an appmach similar to .Justice Thomas's "underestimates the rolt•
of the Establishment Clause as a coguarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of
religious liberty." Sch. Dist. v. Schempp. :174 U.S. 2(J:l, 2flfi (196:1) (Brennan. ,J.,
concurring). His main premise was that the "Framers did not L'ntrust the liberty of
religious beliefs to either clause alone," but that the two l{digion ClausL'S best protect
individual religious rights when applied in harmony with l'ach other. Id. lie continues
that "religious Iibert,· ... would not be viable if tlw Constitution were interprcoted to
forbid only establishments ordained by Congress." !d. at 2P>K
lHfi. Elh (;roue. i)42 U.S. at 49 (Thomas. ,J.. concurring).
187. Id.
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Justice Thomas also argued that Lee failed to correctly
address the Establishment Clause, but merely perverted the
definition of coercion.l ss He stated that coercion, in terms of
the Establishment Clause, necessarily calls for actual legal
coercion "'by force of law and threat of penalty."' 189 He agreed
that the Establishment Clause bars governmental preferences
for particular religious faiths, but reiterates that "[l]egal
compulsion is an inherent component of 'preferences' in this
context."190
In essence, Justice Thomas believed the Pledge of
Allegiance does not offend the Constitution because 1) it did
not violate the Free Exercise Clause; and 2) the Fourteenth
Amendment did not incorporate the Establishment Clause and
therefore did not apply. Furthermore, he believed that even if
the Establishment Clause did apply, the Pledge of Allegiance is
still constitutional because 1) the definition of coercion stated
by the Court in Lee was incorrect and 2) the Pledge does not
constitute coercion in his own coercion test. 191

IV. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
On November 4, 2002, Congress passed S. 2690, which the
President signed on November 13, 2002, reaffirming the
language of the Pledge of Allegiance with the "under God"
phrase included: "In codifying this subsection, ... the 107th
Congress reaffirmed the exact language that has appeared in
the Pledge for decades." 192
A. Congressional Motive

Not afraid to be transparent as to its motivation for the
resolution, Congress declared that the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals' holding and rationale in Newdow was "erroneous."19:1

lHH. !d.
lilY. /d. (quoting Le<• v. Weisman, fi()fi U.S. Fi77. ti40 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
180. !d. at ii3.
191. /d. at 4:1.61-62. ii·1.
192. 1 U.S.C. § 4 (Supp. 2002) (S. 2690. ~ 1 is comprised of "Findings." S. 2690 §2 is
the actual 1·eaffirmation of thP Pledge. Thf~ bill has since be<'n passed as Public Law
107-29:1 and codified in 4 U .S.C. §4. Thus, while these findings probably represent
what would be labeled "legislative history," they are publishled in the actual code
section and are not mPn~ly found in supplempntal sources of legislative history).
19:1 !d.
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Congress criticized the Ninth Circuit's rationale by pointing
out that by adhering to its reasoning, "absurd result[s]" would
follow. 194 For example, even "teacher-led voluntary recitations
of the Constitution itself would be unconstitutional," since the
Constitution contains an "express religious reference'' by use of
the phrase "Year of our Lord" in Article VII. 19Fi

B. Congressional Justification
In the 2002 amendment to 4 U.S.C. §4, which re-codified
the Pledge of Allegiance, Congress added authority to its intent
by adding a section entitled "Findings" in support of the
Pledge's use of the phrase "under God."l96 Traveling across an
American heritage timeline of sorts, Congress expressed to the
courts and to the American public its resolve to secure the
Pledge of Allegiance in its present form.
Congress began by describing the Mayflower Compact,
which declared, "Having undertaken, for the Glory of God and
the advancement of the Christian Faith and honor of our King
and country, a voyage to plant the first colony in the northern
parts of Virginia." 197
Congress next appealed to the founding of the Nation by
quoting the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these
Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness."198 Then, through a nostalgic look at notable
Founders, Congress related quotes by Thomas Jefferson. "God
who gave us life gave us liberty,"l99 and George Washington,
"Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can
repair; the event is in the hand of God!"200
In a clear jab at the Court's rocky Establishment
jurisprudence, Congress added another tidbit of American
history trivia:
On ,July 21, 1789, on the same day that it approved the
194.
19:).
l9li.

ld.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
ld.

(quoting TilE MAYFLOWER COMI'i\CT (1620)).
(quoting Till<: lh:CLi\RATION OF lNilEPE;\IDENC:E, para. 1 (U.S. 1 77(i)).
1~19.
(quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, N()'f'I<;S ON THE S'l'i\TE OF VIJU;JNIA ( 17H I)).
200.
(quoting G<,m·gp Washington, !'resident of the Constitutional Conwnl ion.
Befon• the Constitutional Convention Delegates (May 14, 17H7)).
197.

198.

2]

THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

307

Establishment Clause concerning religion, the First Congress
of the United States also passed the Northwest Ordinance,
providing for a territorial government for lands northwest of
the Ohio Hiver, which declared: "Heligion, morality, and
knowledge, being necessary to good government and the
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education
shall forever lw encouraged."201

Congress then appealed to the same authority that
Reverend Docherty did in his sermon: George Washington's
proclamation for "a day of public thanksgiving and prayer," and
Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, which included the
phrase "under God."202 Again showing the American public
that this amendment was a direct congressional response to
the federal courts' current Pledge jurisprudence, Congress cited
Supreme Court case law as further justification for its
measure.20:1 Citing the 1952 Zorach v. Clauson decision,
Congress quoted Justice William Douglas who wrote for the
Court:
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every
and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and
State. !={ather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific
ways, in which there shall be no concern or union or
dependency one on the other. That is the common sense of the
matter. Othl~rwise the State and religion would be aliens to
each other~hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly .... A
fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the
supplication with which the Court opens each session: "God
save the United States and this Honorable Court."204

Congress lastly reminded the courts and the American
people of its own precedent by noting the 1954 amendment to
the Pledge passed by Congress and signed by President
Eisenhower, the 1956 congressional proclamation of the
national motto of the United States as "In God We Trust," and
other examples of "reference to our religious heritage" as noted
by former Chief Justice Burger.205

:201. lei. (quoting NoH'I'HWJ·:ST ORDINANCE, art. Ill (U.S. 17H7)).
:20:2. lei. ('"[TJhat this Nation. under God, shall have a 1ww birth of freedom -- and
that Gm·ernnwnt of the people, by the people, for the people. shall not perish from the
earth ... (quoting Abraham Lincoln. Gettysburg Address (Nov. Hl. J 86c3) (emphasis
added)).
:203. lei.
204. lei. (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, :343 U.S. :306, :312-l:l (1%2)).
20:0. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (l!'JH4)).
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Congress's findings added authority to the Pledge's existing
wording and signaled Congress's intent to maintain it, even in
the face of Elk Grove v. Newdow.
V. POST-ELK GROVE LITIGATION
Although the Supreme Court handed down its opmwn in
Elk Grove v. Newdow just four years ago, much has happened
with respect to the Pledge of Allegiance and its struggle for
survival in today's public schools. By the looks of it, the final
determinative ruling on the Pledge of Allegiance is just on the
horizon.
A. N ewdow v. Congress
Undeterred by the Supreme Court's 2004 decision, Michael
Newdow initiated yet another challenge to the Pledge in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California on
January 3, 2005.206 This time around, Newdow filed suit as a
co-plaintiff with two other sets of parents and their minor
children, whom he represented as counsel.207 While Newdow
still lacked standing, the court held that the other parents had
standing to challenge the school district policy.20K The district
court, which issued its decision on September 14, 2007, held
that Newdow III was binding precedent and enjoined the school
district from enforcing its Pledge policy, but stayed the ruling
pending its appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.209
The Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments in the case on
Tuesday, December 4, 2007.210

206. Complaint. Newdow v. Cong .. :3H:l F. Supp.2d 1229 (E.D. C'al. 200i'i) (No. Civ.
S-05-17LKK/DAD).
207. Newdow, :383 F. Supp.2d at 12:ll-:32. The additional plaintiffs are ilb1tified
as Jan Doe, Pat Doe. and Jan Roe (parents). and Doe Child. Roechild-1. and Ropchild-2
(minor children). fcl. at 1231 n.l.
208. !d. at 12:17.
209. Newdow v. Cong., No. Civ.SOfil7LKKDAD, 200G WL :JJ440tlf;, at *1 *2 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 18, 2005).
210. Audio of Oral Arguments. Newdow v. Rio Linda. No. OG-17257 (9th Cir.
argued Dec. 4, 2007), auailable at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/media.nsf/
24E980CBAF33C47A882573A 70079617:ll$file/05-172:>7. wma. The Ninth Circuit's
three-judge panel that heard Newdow's latest Pledge challenge consisted of ,Judges
Steven Reinhardt, Dorothy Nelson, and Carlos Bea. ld. While Nelson and Bea are new
to the Pledge debate. Reinhardt was part of the 2-1 majority that d<·clared the Pledge
unconstitutional. If oral arguments are indicative, Reinhardt is still unwavering in his
position. For example, when. in response to ,Judge Bea's question. Reinhardt suggested
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If precedent is any indication, it is likely that the Ninth
Circuit will affirm the district court's order. Whatever the
Ninth Circuit's decision, however, it is likely that an appeal
will be taken by the losing party. If that is the case, the
Supreme Court could hear the case as early as late 2008 and
could render a decision on the issue sometime in early-to-mid
2009. Although this timetable is merely speculative, it
represents the immediacy of the Court's likely need to address
this issue on its merits. With such a potential landmark case
on the near horizon, a justice-specific speculation on the
Court's leaning based on previous jurisprudence becomes
particularly pertinent. In addition, however, the political
pressures facing the justices is a factor that cannot be brushed
aside and ignored based on an ideological hope of indifference.

to Newdow that an inherent stigma is sufficient injury for a student who leaves the
classroom during the Pledge, Bea jokingly labeled the timdy assistance as "a lifeline."
.Judge 13ea. on tlw otlwr hand, n'minded Newdow that of the Supreme Court justices
who have discussed the constitutionality of "under God" in the Pledge, all fourteen
have sided with the Pk•clge (noting that in Alle,l{heny. the Court even used the Pledge
as a permissibl<' constitutional benchmark). Notwithstanding, Nelson asked if
removing "God" from the pJr,clge would make it any less patriotic. !d.
The appellants split their time between thrc•e parties, but the government
began by mwquivocally declaring. "Thr• voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance
in pub Iic schools does not violate the Establishment Clause." Ther·eafter. the appPllants
essentially argtJPd (l) the district court erred by relying on the vacated Newdow Ill
decision, (2) the Pledge is not "akin" to the prayer in Lee, (:i) the Pledge is a legitimate
element of the school curriculum that teaches tolerance for those who choose not to
participate, and (4) thr' refenmce to God is not a religious affirmation. but a reference
to the "philosoplwr's Gocl" or ceremonial deism, which is a Brennan and O'Connor-like
idea of ceremonial deism. ld.
Michael 1\'ewdow contended that the Pledge has religious significance,
characterizing the case as not being between believers and nonbelievers. but instead
between one group that belir,ves in treating people equally and one group that believes
in treating peoplr' unequally. He plead to the court. "I hope this Court will go for
equalitv.'' In the context. of this Comment, an exchange between Newdow and the panel
regarding the Supreme' Court's likely disposition is particularly ironic. The panel
advisc·cl Newclow, "If I were you, 1 wouldn't try to count up the votes.'' Notwithstanding,
Newdow contendr,d, "I think there's definitely four votes there and I'm not sure there
aren't many mon,. WP haven't heard from a couple of the justices.'' The four votes
Newclow is likely refprring to are tbose of Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and
Ginsburg. !d.
Regardless of the Ninth Circuit's released opinion, it is likely that both sides
would appeal an unfavorable decision. That being said, ,Judge Reinhardt's light-hearted
remark in Newdow's other oral argument on the same clay and before the same court
(the national motto case) has a ring of truth to it: "] think if we agreed with Mr.
Newclow, you'd have a good chance [of finding out what the Supreme Court would do in
this case]. If we agree with [the government], the Supreme Court might not take it."
Audio of Oral Arguments, Newclow v. LeFevre, No. 06-16344 (9th Cir. argued Dec. 4,
2007): see supra note l:lO.
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B. Congressional Reaction-Again
Congress has never been shy about its endorsement of the
Pledge of Allegiance. For example, as mentioned in Section IV,
in an express response to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision in Newdow v. Congress, the United States House of
Representatives considered Senate bill S. 2690 titled, An Act to
Reaffirm the Reference to One Nation Under God in Pledge of
Allegiance.21l The bill passed the House by an overwhelming
margin of 401-5 and unanimously passed the Senate 99-0.2U
With the passage of this bill, Congress announced
unequivocally that a reverence for the Pledge of Allegiance, as
presently constituted, still exists in the United States.
It should come of little surprise then that on May 17, 2005,
just four months after Newdow filed his latest Pledge lawsuit.
House Bill 2389 was introduced in the House of
Representatives.21:3 H.R. 2389 would amend title 28 of the
United States Code to restrict the jurisdiction of federal courts
to hear certain cases and controversies involving the Pledge of
Allegiance.214 The bill's sponsor, Representative W. Todd Akin,
a Republic Congressman from Missouri, presented the bill with
its 197 co-sponsors as the Pledge Protection Act.2lil
The jurisdictional limitation would not apply to the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia or the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, however.2Hi The hill, as voted on
by the House of Representatives, included the following
addition: "This Act and the amendments made by this Act take

211. An Act to ]{paffirm the Reference to One Nation Under (;ud in Pledge of
Allegiance, S. 2690, 107th Cong. (2002): see ·1 U.S.C. ~4 (Supp. 2002) (citHl
reaffirmation in anwndnwnt by Pub. L. No. 107-29:1, (Nov. 1:;, 2002)).
212. GovTrack.us,
S.
2690
[107th]:
l'ledgP
of
Allegiance
Bill,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sl07-2690 (last visil.l•d Mar. 24, 2008).
213. GovTrack.us, II.R. 2::389 [109th]: Pledge l'rol.l•ction Act of 2006,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-2:l89 (last. visit.t•d Mar. 24, 2008).
214. Pledge Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 2389, 109t.b Cong. ~ 2 (200fi). The hill was
passed by the House on .July 19, 2006, but stalled in the S,·nat.e Committl'e on the
,Judiciary. GovTrack.us. supra note 213. The bill would hav<• am<'IHI<·d chapter 99 of
title 28 of the United Statl's Code by adding Section 1fi:l2 which n·ads in part a-;
follows: ""(a) Except as provided in subsection (b). no court creat<•d bv :\ct of Congn•s-;
shall have an:.· jurisdiction. and the Supreme Court shall haw· no appellatP
jurisdiction, to !war or decide any question pertaining to tlw int<•rpn'tation of. or the
validity under thL· Constitution of. the Pledge of Allegiam·l'. as dl·fim·d in spction -1 of"
title 4, or its recitation." H.K 2:lH9.
215. GovTrack.us. supra note 218.
216. H.R. 2:l89.
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effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply to any
case that (l) is pending on such date of enactment; or (2) is
commenced on or after such date of enactment.''217 H.R. 2389
passed the House of Representatives on July 19, 2006, by a
vote of 260-167-a passage rate of more than sixty percent.21H
The bill was received by the Senate on August 4, 2006 and was
referred to the Senate Committee on the ,Judiciary.2HJ
Although the bill died when the 110th Congress convened.
Representative W. Todd Akin re-introduced it as H.R. 699 in
2007.220 Congress has not taken any further action on this bilL
however.221 If Congress passes such a bill and it is signed into
law, it could squelch any future challenges to the Pledge.
Given the sharp partisan divide on the topic,222 it is
unlikely that a Democrat-controlled Congress will pass the
Pledge Protection Act. Therefore, this battle will likely play
itself out in the proper forum-the Supreme Court of the
United States. Since the Court will likely have to settle the
Pledge's constitutionality at some point, it is important to
examine how the sitting justices would likely vote. With the
departure of two longtime justices since the Elh Grove decision
(the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and the retired Justice
O'Connor), such an analysis becomes particularly paramount
for the Court's newcomers.
VI.

THE COURT'S CURRENT DISPOSITION

To most accurately hypothesize how the current Court
would rule when the issue of the Pledge of Allegiance again
presents itself, an examination into prior opinions written by
the sitting justices provides the most predictable and
trustworthy results. For most of the justices, a glance through
the Supreme Court Reporter leaves a predictive record of how a
particular justice would rule. But for the new justices, Justice
Alita and Chief Justice Roberts, a more expansive view is

217. /d.
21 H. GovTrack.us. supra note :n:J.
21 fl. !d.
220. (;ovTrack.us.
H.K
69fl:
Pledge
Prott•ction
Act
of
2007.
http://www.govtrack.us/congrl'ss/bill.xpd?bill=h 11 0-()99 (last visited Mar. 24. 2008).
221. lei.
222. For PxamplP. ninety-six pm-cPnt of llousl' Republicans supported H. it 2:lH9.
whilt• eighty-o1w perct•nt of Democrats opposed it. /d.
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necessary to predict their disposition on the Pledge of
Allegiance.

A. Elk Grove Insights and Justice Thomas
As discussed above, the various Elk Grove opinions shed
considerable light on the disposition of the Court members.
Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, issued a determinative
"no" to the question of whether the Pledge violates the
Constitution in his concurring opinion.223 While Justice
Thomas might not join an opinion deeming the Pledge
constitutionally-sound under current Court jurisprudence, he
would likely concur in such a judgment and issue a separate
opinion outlining an argument similar to his Elk Grove
incorporation argument, discussed in III.D.3., supra. He might
even call for overruling decisions such as Lee and Lemon.
The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist delivered an
opinion similar to Justice Thomas's, declaring that the Pledge
of Allegiance is not a violation of the Establishment Clause.224
Whether his replacement, Chief Justice John Roberts, would
rule likewise is an issue taken up below.

B. Chief Justice Roberts
The new Chief Justice is likely to follow his predecessor,
Chief Justice Rehnquist. It was not surprising that the new
Chief Justice declined to state specifically how he would rule on
a Pledge of Allegiance case during his Senate confirmation
hearing,225 but he did venture out further than he did on other
possible issues to come before the Court. Chief Justice Roberts
acknowledged that the Court has not been entirely consistent
in its interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment: "That is an area in which I think the Court can
redouble its efforts to try to come to some consistency in its
approach."22G

22:\. Elk Grove Unified Sc_;h. Dist. v. Nt>wdow, 542 U.S. 1, 4fi (2004) (Thomas. ,J..
concurring).
22-1. ld. at HI (Rehnquist. C .• J., concurring).
22fi. Sec Confmnation Heczring on the Nomination of John Roberts to be Chief
.Justice of the United States: Hearing Bej(;re the 8. Comm. on the ,Judiciary, 109th
Con g. :lfiH (200fi) (statement of .Judge John Roberts, Nominee to lw Chief Jus tic_;.- of the
UnitPd States Supreme Court), available at http://frwebgatP.access.gpo.gov/cgibinlgPtdoc.cgi'?dbname=l09_senate_hearings&docid=f:2:lfi:19.pdf.
22(1. Tel.; sec also Kelly St. ,John, Plcdf{e Af{ain Ruled Unconstitutional, SAK
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Even more indicative of his views on this issue are two
briefs Justice Roberts wrote as Deputy Solicitor General of the
United States: an amicus brief in Lee and a brief on the merits
in Board of Education v. Mergens. In both briefs, the Chief
Justice urged the Court to overrule Lemon, a move that would
indicate an abrupt change in the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
In the Mergens brief, for example, Justice Roberts argued
that the "Lemon test has generated results that often obfuscate
as much as they illuminate proper action under the
Establishment Clause."227 He then explained the impact of this
confusion, asserting that the Lemon test "is divorced from the
context in which it was spawned" and now actually prohibits
"practices and traditions with ancient roots in the history and
experience of the American people."228 Certainly the Pledge of
Allegiance could fall within this definition.
In the Lee v. Weisman brief, Justice Roberts argued that the
rabbi-given prayer at a public secondary school graduation did
not violate the Establishment Clause because it did not
"establish any religion nor coerce nonadherents to participate
in any religion or religious exercise against their will."229 He
suggested that the Religion Clauses demand a "single, careful
inquiry into whether the practice at issue provides direct
benefits to religion in a manner that threatens the
establishment of an official church or compels persons to
participate in a religion or religious exercise contrary to their
consciences."230 The Pledge of Allegiance, with its
nondenominational reference to God, would also pass such a
test.

C. Justice Alita
New Associate Justice Samuel Alito is not what one would
call a wild card. Justice Alito would likely follow his
predecessor's lead on the issue of the Pledge of Allegiance's

FRA:-.JCISCO CHRO:-.J .. Sept. 15, 2005, at Al.
227. Appellate Brief for the United States at 43, Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens. 496 U.S.
226 (1990) (No. SH-1597).
228. Id.
229. Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States at l:l, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992) (No. 90-1014).
2~10. Id. at 23-24.
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constitutionality. Nicknamed "Scalito"2:31 by opponents during
his 2005 Senate confirmation hearing, Justice Alito is likely to
be even more opposed to a constitutional ban on the Pledge of
Allegiance than even Justice O'Connor.
ln a dissent he joined in American Civil Liberties Union of
New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of
Education,2:32 Justice Alito showed his willingness to
distinguish Lee as a "highly fact-sensitive" decision that does
not prescribe any "broad constitutional principle[s] which ban[]
prayer at all high school graduation ceremonies, regardless of
the manner in which the decision to include prayer is made or
implemented."2:l:i The main premise of the dissent was that the
Establishment Clause could not prohibit speech allowed by the
Free Exercise Clause since the prayer in question was studentled speech.2:34
Justice Alito also showed his willingness to support even
non-student-led religious speech on school premises in Child
Evangelism Fellowship of New Jersey, Inc. v. Stafford
Township School District.235 Writing for the majority, Justice
Alito advocated a much higher threshold of coercion than
required by the Supreme Court in Lee.2:36 He held that a
religious group was permitted to distribute materials on
campus as long as the students were not compelled to listen to
the speech,237 which the Court demonstrated in Lee and Santa
Fe Independent School District v. Doe is nothing more than a
subjective measure of peer pressure felt by various groups of
students. 2:38
As the Pledge of Allegiance policies currently being litigated
all involve non-compulsory teacher-led and student-led speech,
it is highly probable that Justice Alito will support a noncompulsory Pledge of Allegiance policy that includes the phrase
"under God."

2:11. Cragg Him•s. 'Scalito!' Nothing is 'f~itc' About 13ush 's Newest Pick, HoUSTO~
C!IIWN., Nov. 1, 200G. at B9.
2:12. H4 F.3d 1471 (:ld Cir. HHJ()).
2:3:l. !d. at 1490 (Mansmann. C .•J.. dissenting).
2:l4. lei. at 14H~J.
2:JG. :lH6 F.:ld G14 Uld Cir. 2004).
2:Hi. !d. at 5:15.
2:37. Id.
2:lH. Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe. n:iO U.S. 290, :311-12 (2000): Lee v.
Weisman. 505 U.S. G77. iJ97-9H (1992).
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D. Justice Scalia
Although Justice Scalia recused himself in Elk Grove,'2:39
the very reason for his recusal was his reported criticism of the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Newdow, asserting that "[t]he
[E]stablishment [C]lause was once well understood not to
exclude God from the public forum and political life."'240 This
criticism of the Newdow decision, and his long-time criticisms
of Lemon and other Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
suggests that he would very likely uphold the constitutionality
of the Pledge of Allegiance.
Little doubt can exist that Justice Scalia would turn the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence on its head if
given the chance. In McCreary County, Kentucky v. American
Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, the Court ruled that a
county
courthouse
could
not
display
the
Ten
Commandments.241 In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that
the "Court's oft repeated assertion that the government cannot
favor religious practice is false."242 Assuming he takes part in
a future pledge case, it is quite certain that Justice Scalia will
side with the Pledge of Allegiance as a constitutionally valid
exercise.

E. Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg
Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg would all
probably rule against the Pledge of Allegiance. Commonly
considered as the Court's most liberal justices, 243 these four
have maintained their solidarity when it comes to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In every published
Supreme Court opinion involving the Establishment Clause in
the past three years, Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and
Ginsburg have each maintained a consistent track record of

239. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow. 542 U.S. l. 18 (2004)
240. Pamela Gould, Reli;;ious Freedom Pruiscd, FHEE L\~('1•:-S·L'-.R. ,Jan. 13, 200:1.
a.r•allabl<' at http:l/fredericksburg.com/News/FT,S/9111200:o!Ol200:J/Oll:J200:o/R4();)fj7.
,Justice Scalia offmed his criticism of the Ninth Circuit's Newdow decision at a
Rt>ligious Freedom Day observance in Fredericksburg. Virginia. !d.
241. 54fi U.S. 844, 850-51, 881 (2005).
242. /d. at 885 (Scalia .•J., dissenting).
243. See, e.g., David T. Canon. Hcnetcing the Voting Ri,>;hts Act: Retrogression,
Influence, and the "Georgia v. Ashcroft Fix," 7 ELEC'TIO:\ L.J. :l, () (2008): Stephen E.
C;ottlieb, What Federalism & Why! Science Versus Doctrine, :Jfi l'lci'P. L. REV. 47. fi8
n.:J::l (20()7).

316

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2008

expanding the Establishment Clause's prohibitive reach.
During oral arguments in Elk Grove, for example, Justice
Souter said, "[T]he reference to under God means something
more than a mere description of how somebody else once
thought. . . . So I think, I think there's some affirmation
there."244
F. Justice Kennedy
Given his mixed stances in previous Establishment Clause
cases, Justice Kennedy is more of a wild card on this issue than
any of the other Justices. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority
opinion in Lee, where the Court held that students in public
schools are psychologically coerced to participate in religious
practices when others pray at high school graduations.245
While proponents of the Pledge of Allegiance vigorously argue
that the recitation is not a religious exercise like prayer, even
Justice Thomas has noted the difficulty in squaring Justice
Kennedy's Lee reasoning with voluntary recitations of the
Pledge of Allegiance.246 Opponents of the Pledge may argue
that students are coerced to participate, even though the
policies expressly authorize only a voluntary recitation, citing
Justice Kennedy's psychological coercion rationale as a
controlling point of law mandating the Court to hold the Pledge
of Allegiance unconstitutional as a violation of the
Establishment Clause.
Despite his opinion in Lee, Justice Kennedy's positions in
later Establishment Clause cases would seem to favor
upholding the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance. In
McCreary County, Justice Kennedy joined parts of Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion (1) acknowledging the role of
religion in America's heritage247 and (2) arguing that the
Lemon test has simply been manipulated to fit "the Court's
hostility to religion."248 This second point argues that if
Lemon's purpose prong is not to be completely done away with,

244.

Transcript of Oral Argument at :o8<l9, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
fi42 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-1624).
245. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
246. ~;]k Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 46 (2004) (Thomas, ,J.,
concurring).
24 7. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 906 (2005) (Scalia, ,J.,
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it must at least be used as intended-to examme the
legislature's purpose and not a third party's perception of that
purpose. Along these lines, one could easily argue that both the
text of the Pledge and its codification by Congress in 1954
merely acknowledges the role of deity in the founding of the
United States and nothing more. Such a reading of the Pledge
of Allegiance could lead Justice Kennedy to uphold its
constitutionality.
In Van Orden v. Perry, Justice Kennedy was part of a
plurality that held that the Establishment Clause allowed the
display of the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol
grounds.249 He joined the plurality opinion, which stated that
"[s]imply having religious content or promoting a message
consistent with religious doctrine does not run afoul of the
Establishment Clause."250
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, Justice Kennedy joined
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas, in ruling that Ohio's school voucher program did not
offend the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment251even though the Court noted that ninety-six percent of the
beneficiaries' children attended religious schools.252 The Court
held that the Establishment Clause prevents states from
passing legislation that has the "'purpose' or 'effect' of
advancing or inhibiting religion."253 Since the Ohio law in
question did not advance or inhibit any particular religion, the
Court ruled that it did not offend the Establishment Clause.254
Similarly, one could argue that the Pledge's generic reference
to God does not advance or inhibit any particular religion, thus
preserving its constitutionality.
Based on his more recent Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy is probably less likely to make
a blanket ruling against the Pledge and Congress's 1954
amendment to its text-his chosen application of coercion,
however, will guide his decision about the constitutionality of
policies of teacher-led recitations of the Pledge in public
schools. While it may appear that Justice Kennedy's

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

i'i4i'i U.S. fi/7. G91-92 (2005).
Id. at G90.
5:36 U.S. G:l9. fiG2-fi:) (2002).
I d. at G4 7.
/d. nt fi4H-49 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. :20:3, 222-2:3 (1997)).
I d. at GG2- fi:l.
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence is contradictory, his
discreet, regular practice of distinguishing facts may explain
the facial discrepancies. It is apparent that if Justice Kennedy
wants to side with the Pledge policy on the merits of the
constitutional issue, he will be forced to either vote to overrule
his own opinion in Lee, or follow the alternative endorsement
test for applicability of Lee described by Justice O'Connor in
her Elk Graue concurrence, as discussed above.
Given
his
particular
aptitude
for
distinguishing
Establishment Clause cases, Justice Kennedy's disposition in a
Pledge case will likely be more fact-sensitive than his
colleagues on the Court. While all of the justices make factbased judgments in their decisions, Justice Kennedy appears
less invested in one particular Establishment Clause ideology
over another. As discussed above, Newdow's present challenge
claims a more tangentially-related injury that may be more
easily distinguished than the facts in Elk Graue, which claimed
a more causal relationship between the injury and the
government action.
In light of the facts in the latest Newdaw case, Justice
Kennedy may have an easier time joining an opinion that
upholds the constitutionality of the district's Pledge policy
because coercion is more difficult to demonstrate where its
effects resulted in no injury. Where a causal relationship is
more apparent between the language of the Pledge and the
litigant's injury, however, an argument that the Pledge's
language is akin to the prayer in Lee may allow Justice
Kennedy to more easily adopt a Lee approach to the subtle
coercion of peer pressure and ridicule, which may lead to
striking down the Pledge policy.
Therefore, Justice Kennedy's decision will depend on
Newdow's depiction of the injury caused by the Pledge. If
Justice Kennedy can be persuaded that the recitation of the
Pledge caused the injury claimed to the plaintiffs minor
children, he will likely adhere to his earlier coercion test. In
short, while Justice Kennedy may side with the Pledge in the
context of a congressional act, he is less likely to do so when
injury results due to the Pledge's recitation at school. That is,
while he will not likely strike down the Pledge as inherently
violative of the Establishment Clause, he is less likely to
approve a school policy that orchestrates teacher-led recitations
of the Pledge in a public school, which is subject to compulsory
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attendance laws, when that policy causes a remediable injury
to a student. That causal relationship would more fully support
a Lee coercion application, whereas tangentially-related
injuries do not invoke the same level of coercion. Accordingly,
where a causal relationship is not clearly established, or where
an adoption of ,Justice O'Connor's endorsement test precludes a
coercion analysis, the Pledge of Allegiance will carry the day.
G. Final Vote Verdict
Ultimately, a case challenging the constitutionality of the
Pledge of Allegiance will likely result in a 5-4 split decision. For
the reasons stated above, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Alito, Thomas, and Scalia will all likely rule that school
districts' policies allowing for the voluntary recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance do not offend the Establishment Clause.
Conversely, Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg
would all likely rule that the Pledge of Allegiance docs offend
the Establishment Clause and that Lee and Lemon operate as
precedent to support their striking down the Pledge of
Allegiance. This establishes the more easily predicted 4-4
divide on the Court.
,Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, will most likely he the
swing vote. If he adheres to his earlier coercion rationale in
Lee, he will likely side with Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer,
and Ginsburg, giving them a fifth vote against a Pledgerecitation policy. Alternatively, if Justice Kennedy follows
,Justice O'Connor's more benign endorsement test, which would
preclude a kinship between the prayer in Lee and the Pledge;
or if he distinguishes the latest Newdow facts from the
offending facts in Lee, which would preclude a causal
relationship between the Pledge recitation and the injury; or if
he succumbs to public opinion and congressional ire, ,Justice
Kennedy could just as easily vote alongside Justices Roberts,
Alito, Thomas, and Scalia.
Facially, it seems too close to call; the magnitude of his Lee
decision, however, lends itself best to the conclusion that
Justice Kennedy will most likely serve as the fifth vote m
opposition to the Pledge of Allegiance's constitutionality as
presently practiced in many public schools.
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL PLEDGE

The Pledge of Allegiance itself, as amended in 1954, is
constitutional.255 Furthermore, a public school policy
mandating voluntary daily teacher-led recitations of the Pledge
of Allegiance does not offend the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. The constitutional innocence of the Pledge is
maintained for three primary reasons. First, the Pledge is not
religious speech, but merely an appeal to the historical context
under which this nation was founded and constitutes only
ceremonial deism. Second, voluntary teacher-led recitations of
the Pledge cannot constitute coercion or compulsion. By its own
terms, it is a voluntary act and no assertion of peer pressure
from other students can equate to coercion by the government.
Third, even if the Pledge is determined to contain "religious
speech," it is de minimis and merely acknowledges the
principles of the very fabric of our American society. Even
assuming arguendo that the Pledge is religious speech, it must
then necessarily follow that the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment protects the voluntary recitation of such
speech by willing students.
The Pledge of Allegiance is a pledge to uphold the
Constitution of the United States and the freedoms guaranteed
to her citizens by virtue of the sacrifice and perseverance of
forefathers who secured those freedoms. One such freedom is
the freedom of speech, which includes a freedom "not to speak
at all."256 As such, any Pledge recitation must be voluntary
and not compelled by the government under threat of force or
law.
The primary effect of the adoption of the Pledge of
Allegiance and its recitation in public schools is not to advance
religion, but to instill in young minds an acknowledgment of
the American heritage and the freedoms represented by the
Flag of the United States. By adopting the Pledge of Allegiance,
including the de minimis reference to "God," the government

265. This conclusion and the other arguments presented in this section are largely
attributable to the Elk Grove concurrences. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
542 U.S. 1, 18 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J .. concurring); id. at :l::l (O'Connor. ,J.. concurring);
id. at 45 (Thomas, J., concurring). Any errors, however, in portraying these arguments
are mine alone.
256. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n., 544 U.S. 550, 572 n.2 (2005) (citing Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 4 71 U.S. 5:19, 559 (19H5)).
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has not endorsed any religion. The Pledge is not religious
speech since the reference to God is nothing more than a
reference to ceremonial deism as described by Justice O'Connor
in her Elk Grove concurrence. It has not been canonized by any
religion, nor does any religion claim or enjoy preferential
reference based on its recitation.
The use of the word "God" in the Pledge is a generic one and
can mean a number of different things to a number of different
people. It does not say one nation under Jesus, or under
Vishnu, or Allah, or Buddha, but one nation under "God." This
reference is an example of ceremonial deism in a patriotic
observance, similar to the Declaration of Independence, StarSpangled Banner, and the Gettysburg Address. The Pledge of
Allegiance does not have the purpose or the effect of showing
that the government favors or prefers any particular
established religion.
The Pledge of Allegiance and its recitation in public schools
also fails to meet the coercion test. In adherence to the Barnette
mandate, Pledge policies in force today are voluntary in nature.
Students have the choice whether to participate and those who
choose not to participate are not compelled to do so by threat of
force or law: they are not expelled, detained, fined, and their
parents are not prosecuted, as was the case in Barnette.257
Students legitimately have the choice to participate or to sit or
stand respectively without pledging their allegiance to the flag.
A. Coercion

The legal implications of the word "coercion" is another
paramount issue that has been perverted by inconsistent use in
Supreme Court decisions. Unlike Barnette, students are not
threatened with discipline for abstaining from pledging their
allegiance in voluntary pledge policies. In the context of the
Pledge, the Court must determinatively settle the definition of
" coerciOn.
. "
Lee is the epitome of exemplary cases of coercion
misapplication. The Court held that psychological coercion was
present in Lee because high school graduation cannot
practically be viewed as voluntary due to the high level of
importance placed on it by society.258 Some may assert that
257. W.Va.
258. Jd.

State~

Bel. of Educ. v. Barnette. 319 U.S. G24. G29 (194:)).
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compulsory education laws present a prima facie case for
coercion in school-led activities. In adherence to Barnette,
states cannot compel students to pledge their allegiance to the
flag of the United States and modern Pledge policies recognize
this. Can peer pressure constitute government-induced
coercwn, however? Does invoking Lee-like psychological peer
pressure arguments elevate classmate peer pressure to the
level of government-induced coercion when students feel
embarrassed or ashamed when abstaining from pledging their
allegiance to the flag? The fine line between what constitutes
coercion and what does not begs the question, does the "[l]aw
reach[] past formalism"?259 Pressure from peers towards
conformity is not grounds for coercion. The Court has never
accepted the "follow the leader" rationale or the "he told me to
jump off the bridge" defense in our legal system.
Justice Thomas correctly stated, "[E]ven if we assume that
sitting in respectful silence could be mistahen for assent to or
participation in a graduation prayer, dissenting students
graduating from high school are not 'coerced' to pray. At most,
they are 'coerced' into possibly appearing to assent to the
prayer."260 Equally applicable, it must follow that students are
at most coerced into possibly appearing to assent to the Pledge
of Allegiance. This is insufficient.

B. Public Policy Perspective and "God"
According to a recent Gallup poll, more than ninety percent
of Americans believe in "God."261 This is why <Justice O'Connor
saw the need to recognize ceremonial deism in civic life. The
reference to "God" in the Pledge of Allegiance is merely a
reference to what Justice O'Connor calls ceremonial deism.

1. Unintended consequences
Similar to Congress's observation in its reaffirmation of the
Pledge of Allegiance, striking down the Pledge would be, in

259. L~c 505 U.S. at il9G.
260. Elk Gran• Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow. 542 U.S. L 17 (:2004) (Thomas ..J..
concurring).
261. Frank Nt>wport, Who Belieues in God and Who /Jol's/1 'fl. (;,\LLLP :--IE\\',;
SERVICE, June 2:1, 200G, cwailahle at http://www.gallup.com/poll/:2:l470/Who- BeliewsGod-Who-Doesnt.aspx (stating that "[i]f Americans are simply askPd if' they believe in
God or a universal spirit., more than 90%, will say yes").
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effect, a mandatory precedent that would dictate the
elimination of our national motto, "In God We Trust," and its
removal from our currency. It would also dictate the removal of
the Declaration of Independence from the Library of Congress
and our schools and the destruction of the Lincoln monument,
which bears the text of the Gettysburg Address on its walls.
Necessarily, it would also require the removal of the text of the
Constitution of the United States from every courthouse,
classroom, and library with the strict admonition that the
Constitution not be read in schools lest the state "coerce" a
belief in God as the Constitution uses an even less generic
reference to deity in Article VII: "Year of our Lord."262
Eliminating these fundamental pillars of our nation's founding
and tradition will lead clown a slippery slope that will threaten
the very fabric that makes up the ideals of liberty that bind
this nation together.
VIII. CONCLUSiON
The Pledge of Allegiance was written and adopted as a
patriotic observance for the 400th anniversary of Christopher
Columbus's landing in the Americas. It was meant as a
patriotic observance to honor the heritage of the Nation and
was inspired by the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitution, and the Gettysburg Address, to name a few.
The Court held that students cannot be forced to pledge
their allegiance, but pledge policies today call for the voluntary
recitation of the Pledge. Opponents of the Pledge, such as
Michael Newdow, claim that the 1954 Act of Congress, in
which it added the phrase "under God," qualified the Pledge as
religious speech and is a violation of the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.
Thus, the questions that must be answered by the Court
are two-fold: 1) is the Pledge of Allegiance religious speech, and
2) does the Pledge of Allegiance compel the affirmation of a
religious belief in God? The Court is likely to be called upon in
the very near future to consider Newdow's latest lawsuit
challenging the Pledge's constitutionality. The current Court,
with the substitution of two outspoken Pledge proponents, is in
a deadlock that will likely be decided by a 5-4 vote with Justice

:2fi:2.
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Kennedy serving as the swing vote.
The Chief Justice, as well as Justices Scalia, Alito, and
Thomas will all likely vote in favor of a voluntary Pledge policy
and may even vote to reverse current Establishment Clause
jurisprudence by voting to overrule Lemon and Lee. Justices
Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens will most likely vote
against the Pledge. Their voting record in Establishment
Clause cases indicates that they would prefer to uphold the
Court's current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, including
Lee and Lemon.
Justice Kennedy, although the author of Lee, has shown
considerable willingness to view the Establishment Clause in a
light favorable to the Pledge of Allegiance, but his Lee opinion
overshadows an inclination to completely dismiss his strict,
although misapplied, concept of coercion. Most indicators,
however, suggest that while Justice Kennedy may vote to
strike down a teacher-led Pledge policy as coercive, he is
unlikely to kill the Pledge of Allegiance itself. Notwithstanding,
no one is putting a surprise switch beyond Justice Kennedy,
who is clearly uninterested in committing himself to one side or
the other before considering the matter in its entirety.
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